In this paper, we examine the link between stock market uncertainty and monetary policy in the U.S. There are strong arguments as to why central banks should account for stock market uncertainty in their strategies. Amongst others, they can maintain the functioning of financial markets and moderate economic downswings. To describe the behavior of the Federal Reserve Bank, augmented forward-looking Taylor rules are estimated by GMM. The standard specification is expanded by measures of stock market uncertainty. We show that given certain levels of inflation and output, U.S. central bank rates are significantly lower when stock market uncertainty is high and vice versa. This result is valid for all tested measures of financial uncertainty.
Introduction
Va r i o u s episodes of financial turbulences have been accompanied by decreasing short term interest rates. In particular, the US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) and its former chairman, Alan Greenspan, received a great deal of praise for restoring confidence in financial markets by cutting central bank rates aggressively. Between the emergence of the recent financial crisis in the summer of 2007 and January of 2009, the federal funds rate was brought down by 325 basis points. "In historical comparison, this policy response stands out as exceptionally rapid and proactive" (Bernanke (2009) ). By these actions, monetary policy intends to moderate the direct effects of financial turbulences on the economy and minimize so-called adverse feedback loops, in which financial stress and economic downturns become mutually reinforcing. As Mishkin (2009) argues, risk spreads and interest rates relevant for households, and business spending would have been much higher and the recession far more severe, if the Fed had not substantially eased monetary policy.
Undoubtedly, the Fed stabilized financial markets several times and thereby moderated an economic downswing and encouraged a fast recovery of the US economy in times of extraordinary financial stress and uncertainty. However, prominent economists e.g. Taylor (2007) argue that asset price bubbles are likely to occur when central banks have provided too much liquidity. Accordingly, the relatively long period of very low central bank rates, succeeding the burst of the dotcom bubble in 2001, has at least favored the recent housing price bubble. In the future, this sequence of events might be repeated because the Fed has cut interest rates dramatically in spite of increasing (headline) inflation, when stock market uncertainty has increased due to the latest housing slump and the ongoing financial markets turbulences. 1 Generally, the impression prevails that central banks respond to financial market instability in terms of a reduction in interest rates. Hence, besides price and economic stability, the issue of financial market stability would be a third target for macroeconomic policy or a necessary condition for the two other targets. In this paper, we empirically examine if the Fed systematically compensates enhanced stock market uncertainty by cutting the federal funds rate. Following Gertler (1998, 2000) , forward-looking Taylor rules are estimated to test this hypothesis. The standard specification is expanded by several measures of stock market uncertainty, based on realized volatility, expected volatility based on a GARCH model and an implied volatility measure based on the VIX-index that serves as a proxy for future variability. We show that, given a certain level of inflation and 1 The Fed argues that inflation has not been an important issue so far because inflation expectations are still anchored and increases in headline inflation have been caused by temporary commodity price shocks to a major extent Bernanke (2009). output, US central bank rates are significantly lower when stock market uncertainty is high and vice versa. This result applies to all tested measures of stock market uncertainty in two distinct periods and therefore seems quite robust across different specifications. Expansionary monetary policy in the face of financial turbulences is thus not an outcome of the latest crisis but has been a systematic part of US monetary policy for more than 25 years.
Our results complement available empirical evidence on stock market uncertainty, asset prices and monetary policy. D 'Agostino, Sala, and Surico (2005) examine the reaction of the Fed to changes in asset price returns. They show that the estimated response is statistically different from zero only in a high volatility regime, whereas an unanticipated policy tightening causes a significant decline in the Standard & Poor's 500 stock market index (S&P 500) in normal times only. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) augment the specification of Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 by the current and lagged values of the log-difference of the S&P 500. In contrast to our findings, the estimated coefficient has the "wrong" sign and is not statistically different from zero.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses if it is theoretically reasonable to include financial uncertainty as a third monetary policy objective, by giving a short review on the available literature. Section 3 reviews the computation of proxies for stock market uncertainty. Subsequently, we discuss the theoretical and empirical foundations of an augmented monetary reaction function. Section 5 describes the results. Finally, we conclude.
Should central banks react to stock market uncertainty shocks?
Generally, two branches of literature that analyze the relation between financial uncertainty and optimal monetary policy can be identified. The first branch emphasizes the role of the financial system as a source or accelerator of negative effects. In times of financial stress, it is harder for market participants to receive essential information for the valuation of assets. Consequently, their fundamental value is hard to asses. This situation is referred to as valuation risk Mishkin (2009) . A rise in financial uncertainty then leads to higher risk spreads and therefore, increases the costs for credits crucial for the spending of households and firms. In order to compensate for the increase of costs to the real economy, lower interest rates seem to be an adequate reaction of the monetary authority. Due to the complexity of many structured credit products, valuation risk was an important factor in the recent financial crisis.
The second danger is referred to as macroeconomic risk. Macroeconomic risk always emerges when valuation risk exceeds a certain level and spills over to the real economy. The resulting economic downturn leads to even higher uncertainty so that risk spreads rise and a further economic downturn emerges. The adverse feedback loop between financial markets and the real economy is the so-called financial accelerator (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , Bernanke and Gertler (1999) ). How strong this feedback effect is, depends, among other factors, on the quality of assets that serve as collateral for the liabilities. In the recent financial crisis, the quality of these assets was often poor and the economic downturn often further diminished the value of these assets. Interest rate cuts can prevent spill-over effects from financial markets to the real economy that can trigger a self-feeding economic downturn. The logic above indicates that monetary policy is even more powerful than in normal times because it not only lowers risk-free interest rates, but additionally helps to lower credit spreads.
However, as Bernanke and Gertler (1999) show for a New Keynsian Model (NKM), asset price bubbles and financial accelerator effects are no reason to include asset prices as a distinctive monetary policy objective. In the NKM an opening output gap automatically induces a type of inflationary or deflationary pressure. By adjusting interest rates in order to keep expected inflation as close to the target as possible, the central bank can minimize the effects of asset price bubbles on output. In reality however, it seems to be rather unlikely that all financial uncertainty shocks that can trigger a severe recession have a simultaneous and stable negative effect on inflation. Moreover, asset prices or asset price changes can be seen as a first order shock and do not reflect financial uncertainty in our terms. In our view, the expected volatility of returns, and not the level of returns on assets, is crucial.
The second branch of literature analyzes the effects of enhanced uncertainty with a more general perspective. Since investments and purchases of durable consumer goods can be seen as being largely irreversible, firms and households may find it advantageous to postpone purchases until the future seems to be more certain (Hu (1995) , Choudhry (2003) ). In a recent paper, Bloom (2009) developed a more elaborate model with time-varying shock volatility and a mix of labor and capital adjustment costs. Due to these non-convex adjustments costs, the model solution exhibits a range of economic inactivity where neither investment nor hiring activities are made. Firms only invest or hire when the economic outlook is sufficiently positive, and disinvest or fire when the economic conditions are sufficiently negative. When uncertainty rises, the region of inactiveness becomes larger and more firms postpone hiring and investment decisions. Economic activity falls dramatically because the real-option value of waiting rises. Uncertainty itself can therefore be seen as a distinct second-order macro shock to which monetary policy should react independently from first order shocks and pure financial crisis.
However, some doubts remain if pure interest rate cuts are adequate to eliminate the full effects of these shocks. On the one hand, monetary policy could better concentrate on removing the reasons for enhanced uncertainty. The provision of liquidity to the private banking sector was therefore one of the major objectives of the Fed and other important central banks to cope with the recent financial crisis (Bernanke (2009) ). On the other hand, policy rates are the most prominent proxy for the stance of monetary policy. It might be generally difficult for central banks to signal the willingness of fighting uncertainty shocks without substantially cutting interest rates. In the following, we leave the search for optimal monetary policy for further research, and examine if the Fed has systematically reacted to uncertainty shocks with interest rate adjustments in the past.
Proxies for stock market uncertainty
As discussed in the previous section, economic uncertainty is a concept rather than a specific variate. From an econometric point of view, it is a challenge to find proxies for this concept in terms of observable variables, particularly, macroeconomic time series data. As far as we are interested in the empirical validation of the assumption that the Fed responds systematically to uncertainty in the US financial market by means of interest rate adjustments, it is necessary to find a representative definition of the US stock market. The S&P 500 seems to be an adequate candidate as it contains the stocks of 500 large market capitalization corporations from the United States. We use the S&P 500 index instead of the Dow Jones index because it is plausible to assume that its broader definition leads to a more accurate picture of the US stock market.
Following the idea of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) , we use contemporary asset price changes to construct an uncertainty measure. Macroeconomic uncertainty emerges as an output of aggregation of micro behavior of a large number of interacting agents. In financial markets, investors employ various strategies or trading rules which determine the asset prices and form clusters. Clusters evolve over time as agents switch their decision rules in response to changing economic environments. Therefore, the reaction of a central bank with respect to the current asset price uncertainty would reflect the sensitivity of the central bank to uncertainty of the expected economic environment.
Let g n,t = ∆log sp n,t denote the return of the S&P 500 value at day n = 1,...,N during a month t = 1,...,T. A realized uncertainty measure during a month t is defined as
with σ 2 n,t = g 2 n,t as a daily unconditional variance estimate, which is also known as "realized volatility". We aggregate the estimated daily realized standard deviations to a monthly measure, due to the monthly availability of price and output data as regressors of the Taylor rule. Since E(g n,t ) = 0 consequently V(g n,t ) = E(g 2 n,t ) holds, it becomes obvious that g 2 n,t is an estimate for V(g n,t ) = σ 2 n,t . We use the square root of the realized volatility to ensure that the log absolute growth rate g 2 n,t is related to the dimension "day" and not "day 2 ". Hence, σ t stands for the average daily asset price variation during a month. This measure is unconditional insofar as no information about the past or the future affect the computation and is therefore a present variability variable. In order to calculate comparable uncertainty measures (independent of the individual scale), the following normalization is applied
and will be labeled s 1,t in case of realized uncertainty as a substitute for the unobservable and normalized uncertainty s t . The normalization yields to an approximated sample mean of 0 and a sample variance of 1. If the central bank reacts to future asset price evolution, the causation in the Taylor rule should run from s 1,t to the federal funds rate r t , and not vice versa. This theoretical consideration is empirically justified due to the Granger causality test (4 included lags in the VA R , sample: 1990:5-2008:6). The p-value of the hypothetical causation s 1,t not =⇒ r t is 0.03 and for r t not =⇒ s 1,t is 0.51, respectively. So, s 1,t seems, in fact, to be exogenous and potentially a useful regressor in the Taylor rule framework.
A second concept of uncertainty is based on volatility forecasts. In principle, forecasts can be received from a time series or structural approach. Here we use the time series approach as a second measure for the uncertainty concept, and therefore, uncertainty is the expected square root of the volatility in period t −1 for the period t. Consequently, we are dealing with conditional standard deviation (backwardlooking variability variable) as a proxy for uncertainty in period t and, the central bank would be able to build a rational expectation for future stock market uncertainty at the end of period t − 1 and could adjust their monetary policy according to this anticipated uncertainty. Engle (1982) introduced autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models, which are specifically designed to model and forecast conditional variances. These models were generalized as GARCH (generalized ARCH) by Bollerslev (1986) and applied to an empirical example relating to the "uncertainty" of US inflation. Following this methodology, a GARCH(1;1) model
will be applied. sp t corresponds to the S&P 500 index value on the last trading day of a month sp N,t . 2 To consider the fat-tailed distribution property of financial market data, the random variable e t is assumed to be distributed according to a generalized error distribution (GED) with 0 mean and variance σ 2 t conditional on the information set Ω t−1 of all information through time t −1 (e t |Ω t−1 ∼ GED(0; σ 2 t )). Analogously to equation (2), the conditional σ t will be normalized and labeled by s 2,t .
Founded by a regime shift in monetary policy in the US (see section 4), we use daily S&P 500 data from the FERI database from 1979:8 to 2008:6 to calculate s 1,t and s 2,t . Due to the monthly model specification, the adjusted regression sample for the GARCH(1;1) model lasts from 1979:9 to 2008:6 and contains 346 observations. The estimation results (Table 1) are achieved via maximum likelihood. The estimated GED shape parameterθ indicates a fat-tailed distribution of ∆log sp t = e t , which is typical for financial time series. The Ljung-Box statistics of the standardized squared residuals are not significant at any lag, which leads to the conclusion of no serial correlation. The same is true for the p-values of the ARCH LM test. Hence, the variance equation (4) appears to be correctly specified.
As mentioned in the context of the uncertainty measure s 1,t , the uncertainty proxy s 2,t should cause the federal funds rate r t . The empirical validation of this issue will be difficult due to the fact that this concept uses only data from the last trading day per month and thereby disregards available daily information. Consequently, the volatility forecast is based on fewer observations and will lead to imprecise uncertainty measures. Analogously to the first measure the p-value of the hypothetical causation s 2,t not =⇒ r t is 0.23 and for r t not =⇒ s 2,t is 0.07, respectively. 2 We abandon monthly S&P 500 averages based on daily available data because this aggregation would induce artificial serial correlation and would therefore bias the variance estimate.
Therefore, the causality of s 2,t for r t can not be validated in terms of Granger. Although this uncertainty proxy is inferior in comparison to the following and more elaborate uncertainty proxy, we use this indicator in terms of a robustness check for the volatility forecast-based indicators and to illuminate the period in which the following indicator can not be computed.
The final uncertainty measure augments the previous measures based on present (s 1 ) or historical volatility ( s 2 ) and is a canonical measure for uncertainty (Bloom (2009) ). It deals with implied volatility and is called VIX volatility index. The index is designed to measure the markets expectation of 30-day volatility implied by at-the-money S&P 500 option prices. Since 1990, the index has been published by the Chicago Board Options Exchange on a daily basis. Due to the option price focus, this indicator is a leading index for volatility forecasting. In contrast to the GARCH approach, the VIX data is available in period t on a daily basis and operates as an approximation of the volatility in t + 1. Thus, the VIX index is a forward-looking variability variable based on a structural option price model. The normalized month-end closing price according to equation (2) will be labeled s 3,t and will be used as a proxy for uncertainty. In this case, the causality of s 3,t for r t is precisely measurable. The p-value of the hypothetical causation s 3,t not =⇒ r t is 0.02 and for r t not =⇒ s 3,t is 0.71, respectively. Figure 1 depicts the computed proxies for stock market uncertainty. On October 19, 1987, an event also known as Black Monday, stock markets around the world crashed, shedding huge value in a very short period. A degree of mystery is associated with the 1987 crash: one explanation was selling by program traders, another was the fear of recession. Additionally, Congress passed a law that made it more difficult to take over companies via leveraged buy-out. In the following months estimated stock market uncertainty reached an extraordinary peak. Due to the second Gulf War, there was a second peak in 1991 even though the increase was moderate compared to 1987. In the following years, a relatively long period of below-average uncertainty can be observed, which was potentially the outcome of exaggerated optimism concerning the future during this time. In 1997 and 1998 the Asian crisis initiated a remarkable increase of stock market uncertainty: the VIX index shows its all-time peak in this period. In 2001 when the New Economy Bubble burst, asset price uncertainty increased sharply again. Additionally, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New Yo r k on September 11, arousing a high intensity of fear and uncertainty in financial markets that continued until 2003. At the end of the sample, the effects of the latest financial crisis are visible. Starting from a period of low financial uncertainty, all uncertainty measures increased but were still lower than most mentioned uncertainty peaks of the past. 
An augmented monetary policy reaction function
As shown in most of the monetary policy literature, a Taylor rule seems to be the best approximation of a monetary policy reaction function. Our specification and estimation of an augmented Taylor rule follows Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 and Bernanke and Gertler (1999) . If a central bank intends to influence the economic situation, it uses the short term interest rate as a tool. To be able to influence real terms there must be some kind of nominal wage and price rigidity, and so we assume that nominal wage and price rigidity exists. We further suppose that the central bank has a target for the nominal short term interest rate, r * t , that relies on the economic situation. In the Taylor rule we model the nominal target rate regarding the long run nominal interest rate, the inflation gap, the output gap and a measure of stock market uncertainty in each period. We include expected inflation in accordance with Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 to reflect the actual way of monetary policy making. Additionally, incorporating expected inflation makes it easier to disentangle the link between the estimated coefficients and the central bank objectives. Augmenting the Taylor rule by a measure of financial uncertainty yields
r is the long run equilibrium rate, π 12,t represents average inflation between t and t + 12. 3 y t is real output and y * t denotes potential output, calculated with perfectly flexible wages and prices. s t represents normalized stock market uncertainty and π * stands for the tolerated inflation rate. Ω t is the information set that is available to the central bank at time t. The central bank uses this set to form rational expectations, which is shown by the capital letter E. It is worth emphasizing that current variables are not supposed to be part of the information set in t.
The target for the ex-ante real interest rate is defined by rr * t := r * t −E[π 12,t |Ω t ]. Therefore, equation (5) can be rewritten as
rr = r −π * represents the long-term equilibrium real rate of interest, which is only determined by real variables. A variation of the target real interest rate is the result of a difference between expected inflation and tolerated inflation, expected output and potential output and expected stock market uncertainty. 4 Misalignments force a change in the target real interest rate. The values of β , γ and ξ are an important sign of the weight the central bank puts on inflation, output or stock market uncertainty. Another important fact is the interest rate smoothing central banks seem to conduct. In order to reflect the smoothing strategy in the model, we assume that the central bank adjusts the actual rate partially to the target.
In equation (7), ρ ∈ [0,1] represents the degree of interest smoothing. The higher ρ, the higher the influence of the lagged rate on the actual rate and therefore the smoothing effect. We assume that v t is an exogenous random shock that is i.i.d. 5 We define α := r −βπ * and x t := y t − y * t . Combining the target model
and equation (7) we obtain
We then eliminate the unobservable forecast variables, to derive the Taylor rule in terms of realized variables:
The error term in equation (10),
is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation, output, stock market uncertainty and the exogenous disturbance v t . Central banks use the information in Ω t , to decide how to set r t in order to influence the right-hand side variables such as average one-year-ahead inflation π 12,t . Consequently, an endogeneity problem arises. To overcome this problem, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) which seems to be more efficient than other instrumental variable estimators in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003) ). 6 According to Hansen and Hodrick (1980) the composite disturbance term u t has a MA(n−1) representation on account of the rational expectation hypothesis. As the Taylor rule above uses π 12,t , n = 12 holds. In this case, the GMM estimator of the parameter vector is a two-step nonlinear estimation procedure when the model is overidentified Hansen (1982) . The estimated standard errors are based on an asymptotic theory that seemingly holds well in intermediate samples (Florens, Jondeau, and Bihan (2001) ). Let z t denote a vector of instruments known when r t is set (i.e., z t ∈ Ω t ) and orthogonal to the exogenous monetary shock v t (i.e., E[v t z t ] = 0). Replace x t and s i,t , i = 1,2,3, for the unobservable output gap, x t , and stock market uncertainty, s t , respectively. Equation (10), in combination with the assumption that z t entails valid instruments, implies the following set of orthogonality conditions, which provides the basis for the estimation of the parameter vector (α,β ,γ,ξ ,ρ).
The instruments, z t , include lagged values of inflation, π 1,t , lagged values of the output gap, x t , lagged interest rates, r t , lagged stock market uncertainty, s i,t , and lagged log differences of commodity prices o t , which help to forecast inflation, the output gap and stock market uncertainty. Two assumptions make the instrumental variables orthogonal to the error term u t . First, the central bank does not make systematic forecast errors, i.e. we deal with rational expectations. Therefore, a linear combination of the forecast errors is orthogonal to any variable included in the information set of the central bank, Ω t . It is reasonable to assume that the central bank has the opportunity to utilize lagged values for forecasts. Second, the central bank's interest rate decision is not influenced by lagged values of right-hand side variables, except for the case that changes in lagged values alter forecasts of future inflation, output and stock market uncertainty. In other words, it is assumed that the central bank does not care about the past unless it is assumed to influence the future. Finally, we estimate the central bank's target inflation rate π * . Given α := r −βπ * and r = rr +π * we receive α := rr + (1 −β )π * , which implies
If the sample is long enough, the sample average real rate, rr, is a good approximation of rr. Knowing rr, it is possible to calculate π * . In general we use monthly data from the FERI database. The US consumer price index (CPI) is used to measure inflation. Current inflation is calculated as π 1,t := 12 · log(CPI t /CPI t−1 ) · 100 and average one-year-ahead inflation is defined as π 12,t := log(CPI t+12 /CPI t ) · 100. A seasonally adjusted index of industrial production is used to measure output. Like Bernanke and Gertler (1999) , we use the industrial production, detrended by a linear and quadratic trend based on an OLS estimation from 1979:8 to 2008:6, as a measure for the output gap, x t . 7 As previously mentioned, the VIX index is only available from 1990 on. Therefore, the initial estimation sample is 1991:1-2008:5, covering most of the tenure of former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan and his successor Ben Bernanke. As the two other uncertainty measures can also be calculated before 1990, augmented Taylor rules featuring s 1 and s 2 are also estimated for the pre-VIX period 1980:9 to 1990:12. We start in 1980:9 since, as discussed in Clarida et al. (1998) , there was a fundamental shift in the way the Fed conducted monetary policy at the end of 1979, when chairman Paul Vo l c k e r became in charge of US monetary policy. In contrast to his successors, he had to deal with high inflation so it is interesting to see if financial uncertainty also played a significant role for US monetary policy in this period.
Results
In this section we present and discuss the estimation results for a variety of specifications. First, a standard Taylor rule including expected inflation and the output gap is estimated as a benchmark. Then all three measures of financial uncertainty are subsequently included as additional instruments and as a third explanatory variable. Table 2 summarizes the results.
The standard rule (a), which does not account for stock market uncertainty features a strong degree of interest rate smoothing ( ρ = 0.973). The coefficient for expected inflation ( β = 3.713) is significantly above one, and the coefficient for the output gap, γ, is 0.457. The implied inflation target (π * = 2.521) is quite reasonable. Considering absolute values, our benchmark rule exhibits larger coefficients than those in Clarida et al. (1998) or Bernanke and Gertler (1999) . 8 Possible reasons are different estimation samples and slightly diverging specifications. 9 To assess the effective estimated reaction of the monetary authority, the current level of the nominal interest rate and the smoothing parameter must be taken into account. Given an initial nominal interest rate equal to the long run equilibrium nominal interest rate 10 , and expected inflation being 1% over the target, the estimated monetary policy rules imply that the Fed will raise the federal funds rate by 10 basis points according to our estimates and 14 basis points according to Clarida et al. (1998) in the first step. Although our estimate implies a larger increase in the target nominal rate, the Fed's initial reaction to deviations of expected inflation from the target is more moderate.
Rules (b) to (d) summarize the main findings of our paper as the significance of financial uncertainty as an explanatory variable for US central bank rates in the Greenspan-Bernanke era. We show that according to all three measures, the US federal funds rate reacts systematically to the level of financial uncertainty. In contrast to Bernanke and Gertler (1999) , ξ is negative and different from zero at a five percent significance level. According to the J-statistics, which assesses the validity of the instrument vector, the hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to the composite error term cannot be rejected for all estimations at plausible significance levels.
Since we decide to normalize all uncertainty proxies in dimension to their mean and variance, the strength of the reactions to the different proxies are broadly comparable. The strongest reaction can be estimated for the GARCH uncertainty proxy. Given an initial nominal interest rate equal to the long run equilibrium and expected inflation equal to its target value, a one unit increase in the GARCH proxy leads to an interest rate cut 11 of 11 basis points. As a result of increases in the two other proxies, the estimated interest rate cut is more moderate but still between 7 (realized uncertainty proxy) and 8 (VIX uncertainty proxy) basis points.
Another important empirical result of the paper is the change in the other coefficients with respect to the standard rule. The degree of interest rate smoothing declines moderately and the reaction to changes in the output gap does not change substantially. Major changes can be observed for the inflation coefficient and the constant. These changes have a large effect on target inflation and the reaction to deviations of expected inflation from its target value. When the realized uncertainty proxy, s 1,t , is included the inflation coefficient, β , is significantly smaller. However, the degree of interest rate smoothing is smaller so that the effective reaction to deviations from the target inflation is not so dissimilar (10 basis points in the standard case and 6 basis points in rule (b)). The greatest difference can be observed with regard to the target inflation rate. The smaller value for β in combination with the new, now insignificant, constant leads to a target inflation rate of 4%. However, the accuracy of this estimation is also much lower than in the standard rule. In rules (c) and (d) where the GARCH model-based and the VIX-based uncertainty proxies are included, estimated target inflation is slightly more than 2.5% and therefore approximately the same as in (a). Target inflation and the constant are also estimated with similar accuracy. The interesting difference concerns the inflation coefficient. In rule (d) the point estimate is below one so that the Taylor principle is not fulfilled. From a conservative central banker's point of view, rule (c) is even worse. The point estimate for β is negative and significantly below one.
All this indicates that the Fed did not stabilize inflation adequately by raising the short-term real interest rate in case of increases in expected inflation. However, we do not wish to draw such harsh conclusions. What might be concluded is that the Fed merely did not face big autonomous inflation problems during this period. When three explanatory variables (future inflation, the output gap and a proxy for financial uncertainty) are included, reactions to the latter two variables are dominating in the later period and autonomous reactions to inflation changes are not precisely measurable. However, we show that either a reasonable and precise estimation of the inflation coefficient or target inflation is still possible.
In order to examine this issue further, augmented Taylor rules are also estimated for the period 1980:9 to 1990:12. Since the third proxy s 3,t is not available only two augmented rules, (e) and (f), are estimated. The realized uncertainty proxy s 1,t does not seem to work for this decade. Neither does the Fed significantly react to this proxy of financial uncertainty nor does the inflation coefficient exhibit 11 To calculate the interest rate change in basis points with respect to the uncertainty proxy we use
a reasonable and precisely estimated value. However, the second proxy, s 2,t , does. All coefficients are significant at a five percent level, have the expected sign and reasonable values. The point estimate for β is 1.248 so that the Taylor principle is fulfilled. The estimated target inflation is 2.695. Compared to the rules of the later sample the output coefficient is about half of the previous values and the uncertainty coefficient ξ is approximately the same.
All in all, the results suggest that financial uncertainty has played an important role for US monetary policy for more than 25 years. Having results for two distinctive periods, we can draw some further conclusions. Not surprisingly, the Fed strongly emphasized inflation stability in the eighties. In face of large cost push shocks and high inflation, the stabilization of inflation (expectations) was Fed chairman Paul Vo l c k e r 's main purpose. Still, financial uncertainty also seems to play a significant role in this period. In the nineties and later, reasonable reactions to changes in inflation and an inflation target below three percent are not simultaneously measurable if financial uncertainty is included. We do not conclude that the Fed would not have reacted to deviations of inflation expectations from their target value. We simply conclude that in consequence of anchored inflation expectations, the stabilization of the real economy and financial markets were the predominant motives for interest rate adjustments.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the link between financial uncertainty and the federal funds rate. As a result of using normalized stock market uncertainty instead of asset prices or returns, we do not have to judge if a certain level of asset prices deviates from fundamentals or not. Vo l a t i l i t y clusters, that always emerge in time of extraordinary stress on the financial markets, or aggravated uncertainty concerning future economic conditions, can have adverse effects on credit standards and spending. Severe economic recessions can be the outcome. To measure stock market uncertainty, we apply several concepts for the computation of unobservable stock market uncertainty on the US S&P 500. All measures show large values in well-known times of extraordinary uncertainty, e.g. after the stock market crash in 1987 or the burst of the dotcom bubble in 2001.
To describe the behavior of the Fed, augmented forward-looking Taylor rules are estimated by using GMM. The results show that it is useful and necessary to include one of these stock market uncertainty measures as an explanatory variable. All related coefficients are negative and, with one exception, significantly different from zero. Given a certain level of inflation and output gap, US central bank rates are significantly lower when stock market uncertainty is high and vice versa. These results are quite robust and not dependent on a certain definition of financial uncertainty. By using two samples, one ranging from 1980:9 to 1990:12 and another from 1991:1 to 2008:5, we show that pacifying financial markets by interest rate cuts has been a part of the Fed reaction function for more than 25 years.
The inclusion of financial uncertainty as an additional explanatory variable leads to small and imprecise estimates for the inflation coefficient in the later period. One could conclude that the Fed has disregarded inflation control in the last 15 years. However, we only conclude that there was a limited need for inflation abatement and that the Fed would have reacted to inflation if there had been major dangers. Due to exogenous factors that kept inflation expectations low, e.g. anchored inflation expectations, low-cost imports from China or stable commodity prices (at least until 2000), the Fed could concentrate on other important monetary policy objectives.
As mentioned above, there are strong arguments for cutting interest rates in times of excess uncertainty from a theoretical point of view. However, because we analyze estimated but not optimal monetary policy rules, we cannot conclude how sensitive such a reaction should be and leave this question for further research. Apart from that, monetary policy must be successful in terms of price stability in the medium-term. The inclusion of financial uncertainty measures leads to a decrease in the Fed's estimated reaction to expected inflation that is not consistent with inflation stabilizing monetary policy. Facing the increasing frequency of bursting asset price bubbles, and the aggressive interest rate cuts, it might appear that the Fed has been too expansive to keep inflation stable when other inflation reducing factors might disappear.
